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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine the causal impact of the Arab Spring and government institutions on the 
finance-growth nexus. The empirical analysis is implemented for extensive firm-level panel data 
combined with national data covering macroeconomic and institutional factors for the period 2005-
2014, starting six years before and continuing after the Arab Spring. Using Difference-in-Difference 
(DID) method, we analyze the effect of the Arab Spring. Evidence points to financial development 
as a strong positive contributor to growth. The analysis also indicates that the Arab Spring dampens 
growth. These results seem to suggest that political instability adversely affects growth; 
nevertheless a well-functioning financial system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
enhance growth. Therefore, policies aiming at improving the efficiency and the operation of 
institutions such as a country’s legal system, citizen’s participation in selecting government, 
freedom of expression and the stage of financial development should persist over an extended 
period of time, in order to bear fruition and achieve a significant success in boosting economic 
growth and reducing poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
Following colonial independence newly formed and intensely divided Arab states betrothed in state 
planning and nationalization through centralized bureaucratic systems that led to the Arab “Social 
Contract”, a tradeoff between dictatorship and life preservation (Amin et al., 2012). Nonetheless 
delivering healthy per capita annual GDP growth (3.7% during 1960-1985, second only to the 4.3% 
East Asia and Pacific region, see Yousef, 2004, p.96), this social contract culminated in a rentier 
state, heavily dependent on perpetual extraneous profit from oil revenue, remittances from abroad or 
foreign aid. It became plagued by anemic ownership rights, corruption, limited openness, 
segmented labor markets, a static and weak private sector, and in many cases a large informal sector 
(Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Economic crises were an inevitable consequence of this system, 
manifesting in low commodity prices and real per capita GDP growth and high unemployment 
rates. Beginning with uprisings in the late 2010, five distinctly affected Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries, namely, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen witnessed a significant 
disturbance of economic activity. The effect of this movement impacted all countries in the region, 
ranging from timid legal and economic reforms, to self-styled cooperation between people and the 
state, to radical regime changes. Four countries have seen popular overthrow of governments, 
specifically, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, while the revolt and civil strife are still ongoing in 
Libya, Syria and Yemen and to some extent in Bahrain. Whether the Arab state institutions, amid 
their reliance on unearned flow of revenues, were supported by the Arab Spring begs for rebuttal. 
Was the institution of finance used to consolidate the state power through promoting growth? What 
role will be planned for finance post-Arab Spring? Such inquiries call for new evidence to grasp the 
structural context and the relationship between finance and growth within the Arab state. 
In 2011, two changes affected the position of the region: the political and social unrest 
targeting the old ruling regimes in the region, preceded by the surge in global oil and food prices. 
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Although the long-term benefits of the Arab Spring are undeniable, the region has since 
witnessed increased economic pressures and repercussions, driven by internal and external 
sources.  Notwithstanding the indirect cost on people’s welfare, tourism, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), savings and consumption, stock prices, foreign trade as well as national income and growth 
took direct hits. Generally, the MENA region has realized lower annual growth rates in output, 
compared to many other developing regions in the world (World Bank, 2014). Such political 
movements distressed the already low economic growth, and its fragile relationship with the 
financial development.  
In the purpose of giving an indicative example, in 2012, Amman, Egypt and Tunisia stock 
markets dropped dramatically to record low turnover ratio, as well the ratio of the values of traded 
shares to the market capitalization (World Development Indicators, 2012). This was caused by 
global investors having significantly reduced their stakes in MENA region holdings since December 
2010, resulting in significant declines in region-linked stock indexes. The low turnover ratio of 
stock exchanges coupled with slow bank lending reflect a rise in uncertainties and a serious 
liquidity problem, especially in the severely affected Arab Spring stock markets. Arab Spring events 
led to a weakening of the region’s currencies, particularly a strong depreciation of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian currencies that exerted a substantial toll on foreign reserves in these 
countries, lower tourism revenues, weak exports, and reduced FDI (Masetti et al., 2013).  In 
contrast, many oil producing countries may be perceived as more secure investment destinations 
relative to other countries in the region which experienced disorder associated with the Arab Spring. 
Therefore, the substitution effect may have benefited some countries at the expense of directly 
affected economies, although the contagion effect (negative externality) could be simultaneously 
present.  
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In this paper, we focus on the relationship between institutions and economic growth in the 
MENA region for the countries that have witnessed the Arab Spring and the ones that did not. 
Several studies considered financial development as a proxy for efficiency gain; others interpreted it 
as an institutional development which enables economic entities to increase production. This paper 
investigates political instability in light of the Arab Spring and the role of financial 
development in economic growth in MENA countries. Hence the first objective of the paper is to 
investigate the shape and constraints of the finance-growth nexus by taking into account the role of 
the Arab Spring. Therefore, this would help us understand some roots of these popular uprisings. A 
second objective is to assess the effect of the Arab Spring on the regional economies. Some 
recommend increased investment in infrastructure as the second most important hedging factor after 
political stability and good governance coupled with a strengthened private sector to positively 
impact the regional economy. This paper claims that developed financial sectors, like those of 
developed economies, can significantly raise savings and investment rates and, ultimately lead to 
economic growth (Becsi and Wang, 1997). Following this presumption, we examine how MENA 
economies have expanded their financial structures to develop their financial sector and stimulate 
growth in the context of the new challenging scenario.  
The empirical specification is represented through a Difference-in-Difference (DID) model 
using a firm-level panel data sourced from Orbis (administered by Bureau Van Dijk). This database 
covers a comprehensive and comparable source of firm-level data containing annual report data of 
public and private companies worldwide. This dataset is combined with yearly data sourced from 
the World Bank databases covering different national indicators on macroeconomic, financial, and 
institutions. It covers a sample of 16 MENA countries for the period 2005-2014. The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the contextual setting. Section 3 
describes the data and provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. In section 4, 
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we present the empirical strategy and discuss the research hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. In section 6, we provide concluding remarks. 
 
2. Contextual setting 
2.1. Circumstantial background 
The series of protests and demonstrations across the MENA region that commenced in the end of 
2010 has become known as the Arab Spring. It is widely believed to have been instigated by 
dissatisfaction with the rule of local governments, particularly by youth and unions, though some 
have speculated that corruption, weak property rights, unequal access to economic opportunities 
(based on intimacy with the ruling party) and wide income level gaps may have had a hand as well. 
More broadly, increasing food prices and famine rates associated with weather change may have 
acted as stressors that contributed to unrest in the region. The fall of some governments has 
provoked the remaining regimes to compel protesters in a protectionist move. Possibly the toppling 
of regimes in these countries marks the beginning of new uncertainties, mainly regarding the 
problem of succession in the region and the political ramifications on the world stocks of oil as well 
as the price of oil which increased by about 12% from 17
th
 of December 2010 (protests start in 
Tunisia) to the same month in the following year, higher than originally forecast (New York Stock 
Exchange, 2015). Confirming the probability of this risk, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
had warned the world community against this event in 2011.  
Deposing an authoritarian ruler is just the beginning of the change. The challenge lies in 
establishing a functioning and sustainable democracy. Somehow, the Arab world always enjoys 
having a leader with charisma, regardless of what he does or does not do for them. Unfortunately, 
the post-Arab Spring era has been characterized by a lack of leadership, with no respected or 
admired figure fit to carry over the democratization process. An equally important consequence of 
these political upheavals has been the role of social media and digital technologies in mobilizing 
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citizens within areas affected by the Arab uprisings as a means for collective activism to circumvent 
state-operated media channels (Acemoglu et al., 2014). Through social media, the ideals of rebel 
groups, as well as the current situations in each country received international attention. Despite the 
complexity of the Arab countries, they will continue to suffer very unstable conditions unless they 
eradicate corruption and promote social equality. Some people believe that the quest for democracy 
during the Arab Spring was dead on arrival because the Arabs are not yet ready for democracy and 
dictatorship is the norm (Wiarda, 2012). 
 
2.2. Conflicts and costs 
The MENA region witnessed the most frequency of wars (nine in 2014, an increase from six in 
2013) including three wars in Syria, two in Yemen, Iraq, Israel, and Libya. Most prominent were 
the wars in Iraq and Syria (inter-opposition violence). The latter, along with the conflict in Yemen, 
escalated from violent crises to wars. In comparison, Sub-Saharan Africa saw a slight decrease from 
eleven to nine wars in 2014. One war was observed in each of the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and 
Europe, respectively during that year (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
(HIIK), 2014). The number of highly violent conflicts in 2014 in the MENA and Europe accounted 
for fourteen and three, respectively, corresponding with eighteen in Sub-Saharan Africa, six in Asia 
and Oceania, and five in the Americas (HIIK, 2014). 
These conflicts come at a sizable direct economic cost (Frey et al., 2007). For example, 
Libya’s GDP contraction in 2011 was estimated to as much as 60% (Masetti et al., 2013). In order 
to grasp the effect of Arab Spring events on domestic aspects of the economy, we look at some of 
the costs associated with terrorism, a similar incident. Enders and Sandler (1995) study the 
relationship between international terrorism and tourism in Spain, and find that a typical terrorist act 
in Spain scares away over 140,000 tourists; terrorism affects the inflow of tourists, but not the 
reverse. Fleischer and Buccola (2002) estimate a supply and demand model of the Israeli hotel 
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industry to measure the effect of armed conflicts. For example, in 1996, the earnings loss amounted 
to 2.55%, which is claimed that hotels, because of inelastic demand, could not readily reverse by 
discounting room rates. Two interdependencies between different countries’ tourism industries and 
their terrorist campaigns are modeled in Drakos and Kutan (2003). First, the hindrance effect on 
tourists in a given country may benefit tourism in neighboring destinations. Conversely, tourists 
may fear that terrorism could spill over into neighboring countries and, therefore, refrain from 
visiting them. They find empirical evidence for the contagion effect: about 11% of the aggregate 
loss in market shares accrues to other destinations within the neighboring countries under 
consideration, and 89% flows outside the region.  
The effect on FDI is also considerable, given that foreigners have a wide choice of 
investment destinations. Therefore, even benign terrorist activities tend to significantly decrease the 
inflow of capital remarkably to a terror-afflicted land (see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2005). A one 
standard deviation change in terrorism risk, approximately an increase in that risk from the 
equivalent of Italy to the equivalent of the USA, prompts a fall of net FDI of about 5% of GDP, not 
accounting for any spillover effects of that lost FDI on the rest of the economy. 
Political disorder might increase anticipated risks identified with savings, either because 
legal claims to assets are fettered or because consumers are blocked from spending their savings. 
Conversely, terrorism may encourage consumers to place their money in safe shelters. The two 
effects point in different courses: Fielding (2003) estimates a consumption function for Israel for 
1989–1999 with quarterly data including political instability. If there were a complete cessation of 
the conflict in Israel proper, consumption would fall by over 7%, and the savings rate would almost 
double.  
The effect of armed conflicts on bilateral trade has been estimated to be significant. Costs of 
doing business are elevated by a deterioration of security caused by terrorism. Also, heightened 
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security in response to a terrorist incident increase transaction costs. Third, the risk of a direct 
damage of traded goods emerges. Using a gravity model with 177 countries during 1968–1999, 
Blomberg and Hess (2006) endorse the negative effect of terrorism on trade. They find that a 
country that suffers from a conflict endures a 5.1% decrease in bilateral trade. These concerns raise 
questions about how the governments are covering these costs. 
 
2.3. Government responses  
Despite, and in response to, the deep conflicts in the region outlined above, the following countries 
in transition have struggled to maintain broad macroeconomic stability, as shown in Table 1. This is 
manifested in single digit inflation with the exception of Egypt, shrinking budget deficits starting in 
2014, external current account deficits narrowing down and increased reserves. These public efforts 
show fiscal responsibility and an attempt to move in the right direction; however, governments need 
to maintain this position in the face of currently heightened uncertainty.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Table 2, shows the impact on some economic indicators for selected economies affected by 
the Arab Spring. Reforms have started taking place as exemplified by Egypt lifting the energy 
subsidies and laws on investment, licensing a credit bureau, and public-private partnerships in 
Jordan, though financial inclusion remains at an early stage with mainly underdeveloped financial 
institutions and a low banking rate (IMF, 2014b). Current account deficits have slightly worsened 
for Egypt, and more so for Libya. Certain aspects of public debt have worsened, however most of 
these countries have internal debt with the exception of Tunisia, and to a lesser degree Morocco. 
Therefore, governments need to continue with the pace of economic reforms that are intended at 
narrowing fiscal financing needs, in cooperation with international creditors and organizations. 
[Table 2 near here] 
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2.4. Institutions 
The governments in the region have lagged behind other geo-economic regions in terms of voice 
accountability and government effectiveness. Figure 1 shows a comparison between MENA region 
and other regions in the world. The stylized facts in subsection 2.1 above explain the tendency of 
the public sector in MENA region to be less accountable and for corruption and bureaucracy to 
reign in. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
The literature abounds with studies on the importance of institutions including financial 
development and growth. Hassan et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in developing countries. Katircioglu et al. (2007) and Awojobi, 
(2013) show that a robust financial structure can promote economic growth proving support to the 
‘supply-leading’ hypothesis. On the other hand, additional research has found a negative 
relationship between finance and growth in developed countries (Aghion et al., 1999). However, 
conclusions based on cross-country analysis are sensitive to the sample of countries, the estimation 
methods, the frequency of the data, the functional form being estimated, and the proxy measures 
selected in the study. Since all of these concerns raise reservations about the reliability of cross-
country regression analysis (see Khan and Senhadji, 2003), we opt to benefit from the panel data 
approach in this paper.  
While Levine (1997) believes that financial intermediaries enhance economic efficiency, 
and ultimately growth, by helping allocate capital to its best uses, Lucas (1988) asserts that the role 
of the financial sector in economic growth is “over-stressed”. The role of financial institutions in 
transition countries, like in the post-Spring era, is complicated by the necessary reforms that have 
been recently introduced; hence a deeper financial sector may or may not add to growth over this 
changeover period. Notwithstanding the controversy, modern theoretical literature on the finance–
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growth nexus combines the endogenous growth theory and microeconomics of financial systems 
(Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rebelo, 1991; Pagano, 1993; Khan, 
2001; among others). This paper mirrors the findings of Faria and McAdam (2015) in that early 
gains of some regional economies are later reversed in the post-Spring phase, especially after some 
reforms were introduced. 
 
3. Data and proxy measures  
In this paper, we combine (i) yearly, firm-level data from Orbis that is provided by Bureau Van 
Dijk; and (ii) yearly, country-level data covering variables on macroeconomic, financial, institutions 
and an indicator of Arab Spring derived from different sources. Our dataset extends over the period 
2005-2014 and includes firms located in 16 Arab countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. Thus, our dataset allows us to have a panel of 10 
years in order to examine the finance-growth nexus in light of the Arab Spring events that have 
started in 2011. Our final sample comprises 5,770 firms after excluding observations with missing 
values for some covariates 
Table 3 shows the definition, source and the summary statistics of variables used in the 
analysis. The dependent variable is the real annual growth rate of gross domestic product per capita 
(GDPC), using year 2010 as the base year. Specifically, growth variable is defined as the difference 
in the log of GDPC between periods t and t-1 in country i (i=1, 2,...,N) (see e.g. Mankiw, 1995; 
Hasan et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2011). Interestingly, the average of the growth rate of the GDPC is 
negative raising alarming questions about the determinants of growth in this region of the world in a 
period of fundamental political and economic changes. 
[Table 3 near here] 
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Firm-related variables cover a comprehensive and comparable source of firm-level data 
containing annual information of public and private companies worldwide. It should be noted that 
one of the many advantages of using Orbis survey, is that the questions are identical through firms 
across all countries. Firm variables (controls) include information on firm’s current assets to its 
current liabilities, total amount of expenses on research and development activities, number of 
raising recommendations (30 days), and an indicator variable for firm size. 
The explanatory variables also include macroeconomic variables sourced from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2014 database. These variables include inflation rate, 
unemployment rate, trade balance, and fixed telephone subscriptions. It is interesting to observe that 
the averages of inflation and unemployment rates are quite high and are equal to 4.17% (with a 
standard deviation of 4.33%) and 27.46% (with a standard deviation of 15.44%), respectively. The 
trade balance standard deviation is particularly high, reflecting the raised uncertainty due to political 
turmoil that affected the volatility of export levels of MENA countries. 
Financial variables are also taken from the World Development Indicators database. There is 
a variety of measures that have been used in the literature as proxies for the level of financial 
development. In this paper, we use four direct proxies widely used in the growth literature that 
include information on financial intermediaries in addition to banks. The first proxy is the domestic 
credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP). Higher domestic credit indicates a higher degree of 
dependence upon the financial sector for financing (Hassan et al., 2011). The second proxy is the 
domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) where a high ratio of domestic credit to private sector 
indicates a higher level of domestic investment reflecting a higher development of the financial 
system (Bangake and Eggoh 2011; Hassan et al., 2011). According to De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995), credits provided by the financial sector measures more precisely the real amount of funds 
available for the economy. Indeed, financial institutions that provide more credit to private sector 
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are more likely to manage credit risk and operations and thus require a better financial development. 
The third proxy is the money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP. Higher M2/GDP indicates an 
expansion in the financial intermediary sector relative to the rest of the economy and it captures the 
degree of monetization in the economy (King and Levine, 1993). Thus, if the financial sector 
develops more than the real sector of the economy, this ratio will increase over time. The fourth 
proxy for financial development is the bank capital to assets ratio (%). This indicator includes funds 
contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation 
adjustments. It helps to determine if the banking sector has enough capital in accordance with the 
Basel requirements. Higher bank capital to total assets measures the soundness of banks and the 
capacity of the banking sector to expand its financial operations in the economy (Arayssi, 2015). 
These indicators measure financial depth of a country and have been widely used in the literature on 
the relationship between economic growth and financial deepening (see for example Calderón and 
Liu, 2003; Wolde-Rufael, 2009; Bangake and Eggoh, 2011; Marques et al., 2013). Additionally, 
they overcome some shortcomings of alternative measures (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995).  
Institutional variables, i.e. public governance variables, include: Polity4 indicator, derived 
from Polity IV Project, is an index of democracy and limits of executive power (Jaggers and 
Marshall, 2000). It is called the combined polity score, calculated by taking the democracy score 
minus the autocracy score. The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from the six authority 
characteristics (regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment; operational 
independence of chief executive or executive constraints; and regulation and competition of 
participation). Polity4 ranges from −10 to 10 with higher values representing more democratic 
regimes. Second, we use the rule of law indicator, derived from the publicly available World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 2014 database, that reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
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enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. It ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). Third, voice and accountability indicator, 
derived from the same database, is an index that reflects perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. It ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). 
Finally, we use Burden of customs indicator, derived from the World Development Indicators, is an 
index of business executives’ perceptions of their country’s efficiency of customs procedures 
(1=extremely inefficient to 7=extremely efficient). Interestingly, the averages of these indicators are 
-5.66, 57.11, 21.27, 4.46, respectively, indicating the low classification of Arab countries with 
institutions and public governance on the democracy scale. 
Our conflict variable related to the Arab Spring events is an indicator which is equal to the 
product of the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation from Arab countries that 
witnessed conflicts, else zero) multiplied by the time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the 
observation from the Arab Spring years, else zero). We use information from World Bank (2014), 
Wikipedia (2015) and Ghosh (2015) to classify countries that are affected by the Arab Spring as 
shown in Table 4. Some countries were severely affected by the Arab spring such as Egypt and 
Tunisia and the events ended by having a new regime while other countries are still in a civil 
disorder and conflicts such as Syria and Libya. 
[Table 4 near here] 
Table 5 breaks down some key variables by country. Egypt, Libya and Syria are shown to 
possess the highest average of inflation rate over the sample period. Interestingly, Gulf countries, 
i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates have the worst 
democracy index as measured by Polity4 indicator compared with other countries that are affected 
severely by the Arab Spring. However, Gulf countries have relatively low inflation rates. Table 6 
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presents the correlation matrix between some key variables. As the table indicates, financial 
development variables are positively correlated with growth. Overall, the simple correlations with 
GDPC growth are moderate.  
[Table 5 near here] 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the finance-growth nexus in light of changes and 
transformations that have been happened in the Arab countries since 2011, using the natural 
experiments of the Arab Spring. The structure of the panel data allows us to follow firm j
 1, ,j J  located in country c   1, ,Cc   across time t  1, ,t T . To study the effects of 
variables defined in previous sections including the effects Arab Spring (AS) on growth, we use 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) method where we consider estimating treatment effects using 
“before and after” data. Therefore, our regression model is: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5GROWTH = + + M + F + ASct jt ct ct ct ct ctX I                                                         (1) 
 
where 1GROWTH log( ) log( )ct ct ctGDPC GDPC   . jtX  represents a vector of variables depicting 
firm characteristics, Mct  represents a vector of variables depicting the macroeconomic 
characteristics of country c in which firm j is located, Fct represents a vector of financial 
development variables, ctI  represents a vector of institutional variables, and ASct is the measure of 
political events that have happened in some Arab countries. This is the DID estimator which is 
equal to the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation from Arab countries that 
witnessed conflicts, else zero) multiplied by the time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the 
observation belongs to the Arab Spring years, else zero). ct  is the stochastic error term. In all our 
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regressions, we include firm-specific fixed effects to take into account the unobservable firm 
characteristics. 
The first hypothesis that we test is the role of the financial development in growth. It 
indicates that financial variables lead to more financial deepening, which in turn promotes growth 
(Calderón and Liu, 2003; Wolde-Rufael, 2009; Bangake and Eggoh, 2011; Marques et al., 2013) 
also for the MENA region (Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008; Abosedra and Fakih, 2014). The 
second hypothesis connects the implications of the Arab Spring on growth. Despite the scarce 
literature on the economic effects of the Arab Spring, Ghosh (2015) finds that the Arab Spring 
decreases bank profitability and raises bank risk. Khandelwal and Roitman (2013) find that political 
instability associated with the Arab Spring resulted in substantial output losses, with prolonged 
after-effects. Thus, we test whether the impact of Arab Spring on growth is negative, since a 
number of tourists were diverted away from countries directly affected by the Arab Spring and 
several foreign firms left the region during this turmoil (World Bank, 2014; IMF, 2014a; Faria and 
McAdam, 2015). 
Moving to the third hypothesis related to macroeconomic variables, we test if inflation and 
unemployment are negatively correlated with growth, and if trade balance and fixed telephone line 
subscriptions are positively correlated with growth. Indeed, high inflation level is expected to have 
negative consequences on growth. In fact, higher inflation and unemployment introduce economic 
uncertainty and are expected to narrow growth. Boyd et al. (2001) used data on 65 countries and 
realize a negative relationship between inflation and the development level of the banking sector. 
Bittencourt (2011) finds that inflation rates have deleterious effects on ﬁnancial development in 
Brazil. He argues that low and stable inflation rate is a precondition to achieve a better development 
in the financial sector. The last hypothesis is related to the role of institutional variables. We test 
whether there is a positive relationship between these variables and growth. We propose that 
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political pluralism and public governance have beneficial effects on businesses and overall 
economic activity in developing and emerging countries (Poghosyan, 2013; Arayssi and Fakih, 
2015). 
  
5. Empirical results 
The empirical analysis examines the determinants of growth in the Arab Region. The dependent 
variable is the GDPC annual growth. In our regressions, the independent variables are divided 
among the firm-level (controls), macroeconomic, financial, and institutional variables in addition to 
an indicator for the Arab Spring that is estimated using the DID technique. The controls also include 
the firm fixed effects. Table 7 presents the results with domestic credit provided by financial sector 
(% of GDP) as the financial development variable. In Tables 8, 9, and 10 we conduct a number of 
robustness checks using different measures of financial development. We cluster the error term by 
country and year. Clustering allows the error terms to be correlated within countries but not 
between countries and thus provide more accurate standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al., 
2011; Ghosh, 2015). 
  
5.1. Initial estimates 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects model presented in equation (1). 
Column (1) presents the results from an empirical specification that includes financial development 
variable and Arab Spring DID estimator. The results show that there is a negative relationship 
between domestic credit provided by financial sector and growth. Additionally, we find that the 
impact of Arab Spring estimator is negatively correlated with growth. These negative relationships 
remain when we add firms’ controls in Column (2). It should be noted that Columns (1) and (2) 
controls for countryyear fixed effects to take into account country unobservable factors such as 
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internal conflicts history, corruption levels, quality of public administration, etc. which are 
(nuisances) captured by including this effect. 
[Table 7 near here] 
In Column (3), the baseline regression, we add the macroeconomic factors including newly 
introduced reforms and find that the finance-growth relationship becomes positive in line with 
previous empirical studies. Interestingly, the explanatory power increases significantly in Column 
(3). It goes from around 27% in Columns (1) and (2) to around 94% in Column (3) indicating the 
importance of macroeconomic determinants of growth, thus providing a reasonable framework for 
analyzing growth in the MENA region. However, the impact of the Arab Spring remains negative 
even when adding macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we accept the first and second hypotheses, 
confirming the positive effect of financial development, in the presence of economic reforms, on 
growth and the negative effect of Arab Spring violence on growth, respectively. The macro 
variables show the expected signs. Specifically, we find that inflation and unemployment rates exert 
negative implications on growth, while trade and fixed telephone line subscriptions are positively 
associated with growth. These findings lend support in favor of accepting the third hypothesis. The 
convergence effect measured by log of initial GDPC is negative, in line with the result obtained in 
Hasan et al. (2009). 
Columns (4) to (7) add the institutional variables, i.e. Polity4, rule of law, voice and 
accountability, and burden of customs variables, separately. First, the results reaffirm that the 
financial development variable is still positively correlated with growth, while the Arab Spring 
remains negatively correlated with growth. Second, the signs of macroeconomic determinates 
remain the same. Third, the results reveal that Polity4 and voice and accountability variables are 
negatively correlated with growth suggesting that possibly Arab countries are still going through an 
irregular path and thus more democracy is not associated with higher growth at this point in time. 
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This is supported by observations from Tunisia and Egypt where new regimes were established 
however economic activities did not improve since the Arab Spring (IMF, 2014b). However, 
institutional variables on rule of law and burden of customs are positively correlated with growth.  
In column (8), the full model, which includes all variables, is estimated. The estimates 
provide strong support to the positive relationship between financial development and growth. That 
is, these results can be related to the well-established literature that examines the effects of financial 
health of the country on growth (e.g., Levine and Zervos, 1998; Quartey and Prah, 2008; Abu-Bader 
and Abu-Qarn, 2008; Huang and Lin, 2009) and are in line with some pre-Arab Spring empirical 
findings from the MENA region (Darrat and Al-Sowaidi, 2010; Kar et al. 2011; Abosedra and 
Fakih, 2014; Arayssi and Fakih, 2015). They underline the role of national financial development 
levels in promoting growth where financial development is a necessary pre-condition for economic 
growth (e.g., Katircioglu et al., 2007; Awojobi, 2013). This is in line with the ‘supply-leading’ 
hypothesis stating that a sound and efficient financial system can improve the overall level of 
economic activities and improve economic outcome in the country.  
The results of the full model also support the negative effects of the Arab Spring on growth 
reconfirming our second hypothesis that the Arab Spring dampens growth. These findings are 
consistent with some previous evidence which suggest that political instability and uncertainty 
adversely affects the performance of the economy (Micco et al., 2007; Baum et al., 2010). A 
number of papers from this literature examine the association between economic growth and armed 
conflicts (e.g. Collier, 1999; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Koubi, 2005). For example, Baker and 
Bloom (2013) use various natural experiments and find that political uncertainty has an adverse 
effect on the volatility of GDP growth.  
Macroeconomic variables in the full model are also in line with previous results except for 
inflation that become positive. Surprisingly, institutional variables show some variations. We notice 
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that Polity4 is now positive in the full model while the rule of law variable is now negative. This 
suggests that Arab countries that witnessed the transformations will perhaps end up having positive 
effects of the democracy on growth in the long-run. Also, these results seem to suggest that 
enforcing the rule of law and public governance mechanisms may not play an effective role in 
supporting economic growth in the context of conflicts. This result can be also explained by the fact 
that the enforcement of law in financially less developed countries does not promote economic 
growth. That is, countries with benevolent dictators result in a better yield of financial development 
on economic growth (Arayssi and Fakih, 2015) in line with research by Mulligan et al. (2004) and 
Yang (2011). 
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
The purpose of this section is to further explore whether the positive relationship between financial 
development and growth holds when using alternative measures of financial development. 
Specifically, we use three alternative measures (e.g. De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995): (i) domestic 
credit to private sector (% of GDP), (ii) money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP, and (iii) bank 
capital and reserves to total assets ratio (%). The results are presented in Tables (8), (9), and (10), 
respectively. The empirical analysis uses the same specifications and variables as defined in 
previous section. 
[Table 8 near here] 
[Table 9 near here] 
[Table 10 near here] 
 
The results are generally found to be in conformity with those derived from the benchmark 
analysis presented in Table (7). They confirm mainly the first hypothesis, concerning the positive 
role of financial institutions in enhancing growth. Also, they confirm the second hypothesis, in 
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regard to the dampening effects of the Arab Spring on growth. The results show that financial 
development variables are positively correlated with growth in the three tables. It seems that the 
finance-growth nexus is still important in the Arab countries despite conflicts and instability in 
some countries. The effect of Arab Spring is still negative and significant on growth with the 
exception of a couple of specifications when using money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP and 
bank capital and reserves to total assets ratio as proxies for financial development. However, the 
negative association holds in the full model in Column (8) in all three tables. 
 When examining the role of the macroeconomic factors (i.e., the third hypothesis), we find 
strong support that fixed telephone line subscriptions and trade balance contribute positively to 
growth. As a result of increased political risk, banks increased their bank capital, as can be seen in 
the significantly positive coefficient of this variable in Table 10. Banks facing increased political 
uncertainty hedge against bad loans and additional losses from investments associated with a 
transitional phase similar to the Arab Spring by raising additional capital. Finally, the fourth 
hypothesis regarding the institutional determinants of growth are also in line with previous results 
presented in Table (7) indicating the overall importance of good and transparent institutions in 
improving growth in the Arab region. This is in line with some recent evidence from the MENA 
region that political reforms in the region aiming to decrease authoritarianism and limiting 
executive power is crucial to allow firms in MENA countries to boost economic growth (Arayssi 
and Fakih, 2015). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Previous literature researched on the relationship between financial development and growth in the 
MENA region ignored the recent political changes that began in 2011 and weakly researched the 
role of institutional factors. Using information on an extended sample of MENA firms during the 
period 2005-2014 that incorporate the Arab Spring, we investigate how political transition affected 
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the finance-growth relationship. It focuses on the role of organizational setting and its interaction 
with the financial development using a panel dataset covering firm characteristics and national 
financial, macroeconomic and institutional factors. The paper adopts a Difference-in-Difference 
methodology and uses a number of alternative measures of financial development. The results of 
this paper provide directions to policy makers aiming at improving the efficiency and the operation 
of the financial institutions in the light of the new challenging scenario in the Arab countries. 
The results provide strong evidence that financial development still is an important 
contributor to growth. The analysis also provides evidence on the significant dampening effects of 
the Arab Spring events on growth. Our results are consistent with evidence which highlights the 
effect of raised political uncertainty on beefing-up bank equity, improving political plurality, and 
planning to reduce budget deficits and encourage investments. These results seem to suggest that a 
well-functioning financial system is necessary but not sufficient to attain a steady economic growth 
rate in MENA countries. The analysis further highlights that institutional determinants of growth, 
such as the level of democracy and the rule of law, play an important role in growth. 
The above results naturally suggest that specific institutional reform policies are important 
for policy makers in attempting to accelerate economic growth. The new regimes established 
following the Arab Spring urge for transparent reforms in institutions. The focus should be 
multifaceted on first protecting and liberalizing financial markets, and second consolidating the role 
of institutions to reinforce the businesses’ and the public’s trust in the MENA economies. 
One can conclude that policy makers and international organizations should consider a 
country’s legal system, political stability and the stage of financial development when designing 
policies to boost economic growth and reduce poverty. Our final remark on the Arab Spring 
reinforces the results of Faria and McAdam (2015) that recent events may well face a rise in 
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political instability if MENA economies fail to sustain a pace of growth that leads to improve 
different economic outcomes. 
A further extension of this research includes studying how the impact of Arab Spring 
differed between oil exporting and oil importing nations, noting the very different government 
finances in both groups and the potential spillover effects on growth. By the same token, it would be 
interesting if future research were to examine how the duration of the Arab Spring (some countries 
had a shorter Arab Spring episode than others) impacts the finance-growth relationship. 
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Table 1: Arab Countries in transition: financing needs (Billions of U.S. Dollars, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) 
  Actual Actual  Estimate Projections 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Current account deficit (excluding official transfers)  26.1 33.4 28.4 34 33 
External amortization  14.3 14.3 15.5 21.5 34.4 
External gross financing needs
 
 40.3 47.7 43.9 55.5 67.4 
Budget deficit (excluding grants)  37.1 47 56.2 61.6 57.6 
Public external amortization  5.4 5.3 5.5 6.2 9.4 
Fiscal financing needs
 
 42.5 52.3 61.7 67.8 66.9 
Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations. (IMF, 2014b). External gross financing needs is defined as 
current account deficit, excluding grants, plus amortization. Fiscal financing needs is defined as the budget deficit, 
excluding official grants, plus public external amortization. 
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Table 2: Selected economic indicators 2010-2015 (Percent of GDP) 
 Actual Actual Estimate Projections   
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Current account balance, 
excluding grants 
          
Egypt -2.9 -4.1 -3.0 -5.1 -5.0 
Jordan -19.0 -20.2 -16.5 -14.2 -10.7 
Libya 8.4 30.1 13.7 -27 -20.8 
Morocco -8.4 -10 -8.3 -8.1 -6.8 
Tunisia -7.4 -8.2 -8.3 -7.9 -6.3 
Yemen -5.4 -7.9 -4.0 -2.7 -2.1 
Public Debt           
Egypt 76.6 78.9 89.2 93.8 94.5 
Jordan 70.7 80.2 85.8 90 91.1 
Libya - - - - - 
Morocco 54.4 60.4 63.9 65.5 65.7 
Tunisia 44.5 44.5 44.8 51 55.3 
Yemen 45.7 47.3 48.2 50.2 50.2 
External Debt           
Egypt 14.8 14.9 16 18.4 18.7 
Jordan 21.9 23.6 26.4 30 30 
Libya 16.1 6.8 8.5 11.3 8.8 
Morocco 25.1 29.8 31.1 32.9 33.2 
Tunisia 48 53.8 54 55.4 61.2 
Yemen 18.6 17.9 16.7 17 17 
Reserves in months of imports           
Egypt 4.7 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.9 
Jordan 5.9 3.6 5.1 5.8 6.1 
Libya 41.1 44.2 48.3 34.3 25.8 
Morocco 5 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 
Tunisia 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.6 4.3 
Yemen 3.9 5.6 4.6 3.6 4.6 
 Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations. (IMF, 2014). Morocco external debt includes external 
publicly guaranteed debt. 
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Table 3: Variable definition and sources 
Variables Definition Source Mean (SD) 
GDPC GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) Orbis 20979.39 
   (19929.50) 
Growth Log of GDPC between periods t and t-1 Orbis -0.00 
   (0.22) 
Current ratio  Firm’s current assets to its current liabilities Orbis 687.73 
   (537.96) 
R&D expenses Total amount of expenses on research and development activities Orbis 61.97 
   (74.80) 
Number of raising Number of raising recommendations (30 days) Orbis 4.38 
   (2.09) 
Large firms Indicator variable = 1 for large firms, else zero Orbis 2.92 
   (0.38) 
Initial GDPC Log of initial GDP per capita real Orbis 12627.52 
   (15402.89) 
Inflation Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %) WDI 4.17 
   (4.33) 
Unemployment Unemployment rate, total (% of total labor force) WDI 27.46 
   (15.44) 
Trade balance Country’s exports minus its imports WDI 9.87 
   (27.68) 
Fixed telephone Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 14.32 
   (5.39) 
Domestic credit/financial Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) WDI 63.58 
   (40.11) 
Domestic credit/private Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) WDI 52.74 
   (21.58) 
M2 Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP WDI 75.71 
   (38.15) 
Bank capital assets Bank capital and reserves to total assets ratio (%) WDI 11.10 
   (3.15) 
Polity4 Index of democracy and limits of executive power. It ranges from –  
10 to 10 with higher values representing more democratic regimes 
Polity IV Project -5.66 
(3.68) 
    
Rule of law Index reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges 
from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
57.11 
(14.38) 
    
Voice and accountability Index reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. It 
ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
21.27 
(9.18) 
    
Burden of customs Index of business executives’ perceptions of their country’s 
efficiency of customs procedures (1=extremely inefficient to 
7=extremely efficient) 
WDI 4.46 
(0.68) 
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Table 4: Summary of conflicts by country 
Country Years Remark 
Algeria 
 
Major protests 
Bahrain 2011–2012 Civil disorder and governmental changes 
Egypt 2011–2012 Civil disorder and governmental changes 
Iraq 2011–2014 Civil disorder and governmental changes 
Jordan 2011 Major protests and governmental changes 
Kuwait 2011–2012 Major protests and governmental changes 
Lebanon 2011 Major protests and governmental changes 
Libya 
2011-
ongoing Civil disorder and governmental changes 
Morocco 2011 Major protests and governmental changes 
Oman 
 
Minor protests 
Palestinian Territories 
 
Minor protests 
Qatar 
 
No major impact 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Minor protests 
Syrian Arab Republic 
2011-
ongoing Civil disorder and governmental changes 
Tunisia 2011–2012 Government overthrown 
United Arab Emirates   No major impact 
                     Sources: World Bank (2014), Wikipedia (2015), and Ghosh (2015).
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Table 5: Summary statistics of macroeconomic, financial, and institutional variables by country 
Country N GDPC Inflation 
 
Unemployment 
Domestic 
credit/financial 
Domestic 
credit/private M2 
Bank capital 
asset Polity4 
Rule of 
law 
Voice and 
accountability 
Burden of 
customs 
Algeria 70 5119.20 4.70 13 -0.66 14.70 60.85 7.40 2.00 27.97 20.91 2.75 
Bahrain 630 24233.20 2.06 47 62.29 61.49 71.72 12.80 -7.80 64.40 19.08 5.18 
Egypt 1,700 4221.80 9.56 21.2 82.87 37.33 85.23 5.90 -3.10 46.34 17.62 3.89 
Iraq 340 3603.80 3.65 47 -4.64 4.30 29.62 
 
3.00 1.94 14.17 
 Jordan 1,840 4417.80 4.25 12.6 108.76 79.01 129.71 12.14 -2.80 62.25 27.58 4.50 
Kuwait 1,810 38994.00 3.77 29.2 64.11 66.08 63.69 12.14 -7.00 66.15 30.82 3.74 
Lebanon 200 9237.60 4.44 47 180.05 83.41 242.19 7.90 6.00 30.06 34.62 3.38 
Libya 40 10572.80 7.15 47 -60.93 12.05 62.48 
 
-4.20 16.72 8.30 3.16 
Morocco 440 2592.40 1.10 43 100.05 63.58 107.16 7.83 -5.20 48.64 28.00 4.31 
Oman 1,070 19841.80 2.65 47 34.23 39.44 36.65 13.17 -8.00 66.09 19.05 4.94 
Palestinian Territories 340 566.60 2.57 28.2 7.62 6.49 18.17 10.01 
 
38.58 24.92 
 Qatar 440 88045.40 1.51 2.2 63.77 40.83 54.60 
 
-10.00 76.87 24.97 4.79 
Saudi Arabia 1,490 23898.40 3.66 9 4.26 38.47 53.06 13.45 -10.00 59.05 4.34 4.60 
Syrian Arab Republic 80 3779.60 33.09 31.2 35.02 14.92 69.13 
  
25.04 4.72 2.97 
Tunisia 540 4866.80 4.75 21.2 72.07 65.79 61.19 7.50 -0.20 54.98 24.07 4.28 
United Arab Emirates 1,060 47560.00 1.17 47 75.55 63.61 64.68 14.20 -8.00 64.90 21.81 5.78 
MENA region 5,770 21113.53 4.28 27.46 63.58 52.74 75.71 11.10 -5.66 57.11 21.27 4.46 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix of macroeconomic, financial, and institutional variables 
  Growth Inflation Unemployment 
Domestic 
credit/financial 
Domestic 
credit/private M2 
Bank 
capital 
asset Polity4 
Rule of 
law 
Voice and 
accountability 
Burden 
of 
customs 
Growth 1 
          Inflation -0.124*** 1 
         Unemployment 0.634*** -0.380*** 1 
        Domestic credit/financial 0.618*** 0.083*** 0.175*** 1 
       Domestic credit/private 0.479*** -0.577*** 0.216*** 0.565*** 1 
      M2 0.150*** 0.058** -0.213*** 0.778*** 0.542*** 1 
     Bank capital asset -0.040 -0.747*** 0.122*** -0.269*** 0.391*** -0.156*** 1 
    Polity4 0.273*** 0.433*** -0.193*** 0.666*** 0.181*** 0.624*** -0.618*** 1 
   Rule of law 0.161*** -0.675*** 0.248*** -0.224*** 0.509*** -0.206*** 0.828*** -0.541*** 1 
  Voice and accountability 0.734*** -0.059** 0.193*** 0.695*** 0.593*** 0.451*** -0.160*** 0.612*** -0.013 1 
 Burden of customs 0.057** -0.557*** 0.468*** -0.079*** 0.223*** -0.211*** 0.635*** -0.462*** 0.594*** -0.328*** 1 
Notes: Correlation coefficients with Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels. *=10%; **=5%; ***=1% 
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Table 7:  DID regressions of real per capita GDP growth (domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of 
GDP) is the proxy of financial development) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arab Spring -1.067*** -1.076*** -0.114*** -0.418*** -0.276*** -0.281*** -0.680*** -0.728*** 
 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) 
Domestic 
credit/financial -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current ratio 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenses 
 
0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of raising 
 
0.012 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
  
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large firms 
 
-0.015 -0.026* -0.027** -0.036** -0.015 -0.051*** -0.057*** 
  
(0.047) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
Initial GDPC 
  
-0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 
  
-0.038*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.040*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment 
  
-0.013*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed telephone 
  
0.044*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade balance 
  
0.040*** 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Polity4 
   
-0.031*** 
   
0.047*** 
    
(0.001) 
   
(0.002) 
Rule of law 
    
0.012*** 
  
-0.006*** 
     
(0.000) 
  
(0.001) 
Voice and 
accountability 
     
-0.020*** 
 
-0.006*** 
      
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Burden of customs 
      
0.240*** 0.360*** 
       
(0.007) (0.013) 
Constant 9.061*** 8.976*** 8.286*** 8.215*** 7.639*** 8.627*** 7.494*** 7.783*** 
 
(0.041) (0.145) (0.052) (0.046) (0.054) (0.050) (0.048) (0.061) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CountryYear FE Yes Yes No No No No No No 
N 5,770 5,770 4,804 4,668 4,804 4,804 4,474 4,474 
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Adjusted R
2
 0.261 0.268 0.939 0.946 0.948 0.948 0.963 0.968 
Notes: Arab Spring is the DID estimator which is equal to the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation 
from Arab countries that witnessed conflicts, else zero) time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation belongs to 
the Arab Spring years, else zero). Standard errors (clustered by country and year) are within parentheses. 
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Table 8:  DID regressions of real per capita GDP growth (Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) is the 
proxy of financial development) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arab Spring -0.912*** -0.914*** -0.172*** -0.405*** -0.354*** -0.447*** -0.640*** -0.684*** 
 
(0.075) (0.076) (0.031) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) 
Domestic 
credit/private 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current ratio  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenses  0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of raising  0.018** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large firms  -0.03 -0.050*** -0.035*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.060*** 
 
 (0.046) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
Initial GDPC   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation   0.002 -0.009*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment   -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed telephone   0.046*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.009*** 0.045*** 0.028*** 
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Trade balance   0.028*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polity4    -0.037***    0.042*** 
 
   (0.001)    (0.002) 
Rule of law     0.012***   -0.012*** 
 
    (0.000)   (0.001) 
Voice and 
accountability      -0.042***  -0.010*** 
 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Burden of customs       0.260*** 0.413*** 
 
      (0.007) (0.014) 
Constant 8.447*** 8.361*** 7.961*** 8.062*** 7.365*** 8.433*** 7.317*** 7.786*** 
 
(0.048) (0.145) (0.058) (0.046) (0.060) (0.048) (0.053) (0.059) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CountryYear FE Yes Yes No No No No No No 
N 5,770 5,770 4,804 4,668 4,804 4,804 4,474 4,474 
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Adjusted R
2
 0.275 0.282 0.925 0.948 0.934 0.951 0.964 0.969 
Notes: Arab Spring is the DID estimator which is equal to the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation 
from Arab countries that witnessed conflicts, else zero) time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation belongs 
to the Arab Spring years, else zero). Standard errors (clustered by country and year) are within parentheses. 
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Table 9:  DID regressions of real per capita GDP growth (Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arab Spring -1.143*** -1.182*** 0.231*** -0.331*** 0.014 0.145*** -0.253*** -0.434*** 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028) 
M2 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current ratio  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenses  0.002*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of raising  -0.002 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large firms  -0.04 0.006 -0.018 -0.013 0.024 -0.030*** -0.039*** 
 
 (0.046) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Initial GDPC   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation   -0.069*** -0.027*** -0.040*** -0.080*** 0.000 0.002 
 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment   -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed telephone   0.037*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade balance   0.034*** 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polity4    -0.039***    0.032*** 
 
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
Rule of law     0.019***   -0.002** 
 
    (0.000)   (0.001) 
Voice and 
accountability      -0.022***  -0.006*** 
 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Burden of customs       0.393*** 0.406*** 
 
      (0.008) (0.013) 
Constant 9.492*** 9.575*** 7.963*** 8.091*** 6.943*** 8.250*** 6.470*** 6.981*** 
 
(0.049) (0.148) (0.057) (0.048) (0.051) (0.055) (0.060) (0.072) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CountryYear FE Yes Yes No No No No No No 
N 5,770 5,770 4,804 4,668 4,804 4,804 4,474 4,474 
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Adjusted R
2
 0.283 0.293 0.927 0.945 0.953 0.937 0.968 0.969 
Notes: Arab Spring is the DID estimator which is equal to the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation 
from Arab countries that witnessed conflicts, else zero) time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation belongs 
to the Arab Spring years, else zero). Standard errors (clustered by country and year) are within parentheses. 
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Table 10:  DID regressions of real per capita GDP growth (Bank capital to assets ratio (%)) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arab Spring 0.717*** 0.695*** 0.119*** -0.133*** -0.130*** 0.209*** 0.109*** -0.025* 
 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.033) (0.013) (0.033) (0.032) (0.016) (0.014) 
Bank capital assets 0.299*** 0.308*** 0.167*** 0.146*** 0.125*** 0.193*** 0.182*** 0.189*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current ratio  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenses  0.001* 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of raising  -0.040*** -0.026*** 0.004*** -0.028*** -0.021*** 0.002 0.002* 
 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large firms  0.021 0.007 -0.028*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.013** -0.018*** 
 
 (0.043) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) 
Initial GDPC   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation   0.061*** 0.045*** 0.071*** 0.090*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Unemployment   0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed telephone   0.034*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade balance   0.022*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polity4    0.035***    0.048*** 
 
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
Rule of law     0.020***   0.006*** 
 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
Voice and 
accountability      0.020***  -0.014*** 
 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
Burden of customs       -0.227*** -0.292*** 
 
      (0.009) (0.011) 
Constant 5.703*** 5.714*** 6.267*** 6.718*** 5.490*** 5.325*** 7.009*** 7.413*** 
 
(0.093) (0.156) (0.068) (0.028) (0.075) (0.083) (0.030) (0.040) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CountryYear FE Yes Yes No No No No No No 
N 5,528 5,528 4,436 4,300 4,436 4,436 4,246 4,246 
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Adjusted R
2
 0.399 0.408 0.937 0.987 0.943 0.941 0.986 0.99 
Notes: Arab Spring is the DID estimator which is equal to the treatment group (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation 
from Arab countries that witnessed conflicts, else zero) time indicator (a dummy variable = 1 if the observation belongs 
to the Arab Spring years, else zero). Standard errors (clustered by country and year) are within parentheses. 
